One of my projects since the beginning of OMNI has been the gathering of evidence revealing the illegality, injustice, ruthlessness, unnecessity of U.S. wars, from the theft of a third of Mexico to the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, resulting not only in catastrophe for the nations attacked but ultimately for the U.S. itself. Such a study has taken a lot of time, not because the evidence was scarce but because it is so ample—not only the thousands of articles but the hundreds of books. Stephen Kinzer, for example, in *Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* thoroughly excoriates U.S. toppling of some two dozen countries with horrendous consequences to some of the countries and their people. But that’s only a glimpse of the slaughter. William Blum in *Killing Hope* and *Rogue State* analyses case by case the 40 foreign governments the U.S. attempted to overthrow, and the over 30 populist movements “struggling against intolerable regimes” the U.S. attempted to crush, in the process of which “the US caused the end of life for several million people, and condemned many millions more to a life of agony and despair.” *(RS p. 4).*

But one war has been clung to as legal, just, and necessary—World War II. WWII is still called “the Good War.” But objections that smiling view exist. In *Worshipping the Myths of World War II, Reflections on America’s Dedication to War,* for example, Edward Wood, Jr., examines four myths “that have masked the real nature of World War II and all our wars that followed” (p. x). See Newsletter #1 for additional examples. But these books have not unsettled the patriotic allegiance to the war, and particularly to the European theater, by the majority of the U.S. populace and the mainstream media. Powerful, patriotic, pro-war myths employed by leaders for foreign aggression and decades of pro-war WWII films help sustain acceptance of WWII in Europe.

However, in recent years WWII in the Pacific has received increasing criticism much more damaging than that of WWII in Europe. David Swanson in *War Is a Lie,* Paul Buchheit in his anthology *American Wars,* and of course Noam Chomsky throughout his scholarly political career have exposed the myths and their harms. One myth annually celebrated is Pearl Harbor Day—that the Japanese attack was unprovoked. Yet still today, despite our long post-WWII alliance with
Japan, Pearl Harbor Day evokes cries against “stab in the back treachery” and calls for vigilance against the terrorists of today planning to attack us.

A major study by Roland Worth, Jr., *No Choice But War*, carefully examines the events leading up to December 7, 1941, and concludes that Japan and the U.S. (and other Western nations) must share blame. (See Newsletter #1.) The war resulted overall because of racism on both sides, from competition over resources, over who would control the Eastern Pacific, and over the embargo imposed by the U.S. and allies. His argument leads one to reconceive Pearl Harbor Day, as I do, as the opening violence of the U.S./Japanese Colonial War in the Pacific 1941-1945.

If this is a persuasive argument, then we who represent a non-pacifist anti-war position against U.S. foreign policy can say with considerable empirical foundation, that except for the WWII in Europe all of the U.S. invasions and interventions were not necessary, but were expansions of imperial power.

Contents of Newsletter #1 12-7-08
Dick Bennett, US Wars and Interventions of Aggression, Rev. of Roland Worth, Jr’s *No Choice But War*

Contents of #2 12-7-10
Review of David Swanson’s *War Is a Lie* by Dick Bennett

**Contents of #3 12-7-11**
Answers.com
Wiest and Mattson, *The Pacific War*
Chomsky, “Backgrounds of the Pacific War”
Revolutionary Worker, “Imperialist War for the Pacific”

The following from Answers.com, Wikianswers both summarizes the basic argument in the following substantial explanations of WWII in the Pacific and the attack on Pearl Harbor as a clash of colonial empires over the resources of the Pacific and East Asia, and illustrates a popular source for the explanation (google). If to Wiest and Mattson, Chomsky, and Revolutionary Worker you add Roland
Worth and David Swanson (and Howard Zinn in his last book on the atomic bomb), a substantial body of argument exists that adds WWII in the Pacific to the long list of unnecessary, illegal, atrocious US wars.

How and why did the Pacific War start in World War 2?

In: World War 2 [Edit categories]

Answer

The great arc of Asia from China to Malasia to India was very rich in minerals, timber and oil. Various nations had fought to control the area for centuries. By 1939 the area was split between three groups. First were the old colonial empires of Britain (India, Hong Kong, Malasia, Singapore), France (Vietnam, Laos), and the Netherlands (Java, Borneo, Sumatra). Second was the relative newcomer, USA (Philipines and various Pacific islands). Third was the other newcomer to empire building - Japan (Korea, parts of China, some Pacific islands).

The old line colonial empires had their hands full dealing with Germany in Europe and were unable to defend their possessions. As such these were easily grabbed by the Japanese in 1940, 1941 and 1942.

The USA had been expanding its influence in Asia for decades. The USA had annexed Hawaii around 1890. Quickly following this the USA picked a war with the weak, nearly defenseless Spanish empire and thus gained colonies in Guam, Wake and the Philippines. These colonies were used to expand American influence in China. However, Japan considered China within its sphere of influence and sought to limit American involvement.

Ultimately this (the conflict of American and Japanese interests in China) led to war. Strictly speaking the USA got together with Britain and the Netherland to freeze Japanese financial assets so that Japan would not be able to buy petroleum. The Japanese were thus forced to choose war or surrender. They chose to attack and thus the shooting war began December 1941.

The reason I give this extensive background is to show that the roots of the war ran deep. The Japanese attack on the USA should not have been considered a surprise. Likewise the Japanese should have realized that the various western nations were not going to give us their commercial interests and colonies in the area without a major fight. The Japanese were hopelessly outclassed in men, money, and machines by the combined forces arranged against them and as such, lost the war.

Read more:
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_and_why_did_the_Pacific_War_start_in_World_War_2#ixzz1fKv3u9It
The Pacific War: Campaigns of World War II

By Andrew A. Wiest, Gregory Louis Mattson, 2001. (I was not able to cut and past a passage from the book.)

On the Backgrounds of the Pacific War

Noam Chomsky

Liberation, September-October, 1967

A word of explanation may be useful. The essay was written for a memorial number of Liberation which, as the editor expressed it, "gathered together a series of articles that deal with some of the problems with which A. J. struggled." I think that Muste's revolutionary pacifism was, and is, a profoundly important doctrine, both in the political analysis and the moral conviction that it expresses. The circumstances of the antifascist war subjected it to the most severe of tests. Does it survive this test? When I began working on this article I was not at all sure. I still feel quite ambivalent about the matter. There are several points that seem to me fairly clear, however. The Anderson essay traces similarities between Japan's escapades and our own -- both in character and in rationalization -- with the fundamental difference that Japan's appeal to national interest, which was not totally without merit, becomes merely ludicrous when translated into a justification for American conquests in Asia.

And his interpretation of it in connection with the Second World War; on the backgrounds of Japan's imperial ventures; on the Western reaction and responsibility; and, by implication, on the relevance of these matters to the problems of contemporary imperialism in Asia. Would be more coherent were it limited to one or two of these themes. I am sure that it would be more clear if it advocated a particular "political line." After exploring these themes, I can suggest nothing more.

A. J. Muste explained the concept of revolutionary nonviolence that was the guiding principle of an extraordinary life. "In a world built on violence, one must be a revolutionary as well. Subconsciously, we tend to give the preference to 'social peace,' though it be only apparent, because our lives and possessions are based on acquiescence in a cramped life or mere submission to superior force." Muste was insistent that pacifists "get our thinking focussed. There are those who say that pacifists are only interested in 'the ten percent of violence employed by the rebels against oppression.' Never in American history have these thoughts been so tragically appropriate as today.

A paragraph of the essay.
...from a social system based on violence and putting a premium on acquisitiveness, and to identify themselves in some real fashion with the utopian technique of social progress less crude, brutal, costly and slow than mankind has yet evolved.

Such standards as these. His essays are invariably thoughtful and provocative; his life, however, is an inspiration with hardly a parallel in American society. In part, he bases his position on an absolute moral commitment that one may accept or reject, but that cannot be profitably debated. In part, he defends it on

It is very difficult to retain a faith in the "essential humanity" of the SS trooper or the commissar or the...
a conflict between two groups of powers for survival and domination. One set of powers, which includes Britain and the ... "free" France, controls some 70% of the earth's resources and thirty million square miles of territory. The imperialistic advantage was achieved by a series of wars including the last one. All they ask now is to be left at peace, and if so they are disposed to make their rule mild though firm.... On the other hand stands a group such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Japan, controlling about 15% of the earth's resources and one million square miles of territory, equally determined to alter the situation in their own favor, to impose their ideas of "order," and armed to the teeth to do that, even if it means plunging the whole world into war.

He foresaw that an Allied victory would yield "a new American empire" incorporating a subservient Britain, "that we shall be the next nation to seek world domination -- in other words, to do what we condemn Hitler for trying to do." In the disordered postwar world, we shall be told, he predicts, that "our only safety lies in making or keeping ourselves 'impregnable.' But that...means being able to decide what may arise -- which would put us in the position in which Hitler is trying to put Germany." In a later essay, he quotes this remark: "The problem after a war is with the victor. He thinks he has just proved that war and violence pay. Who will now teach him a lesson?" 8

This prediction that the United States would emerge as the world-dominant power was political realism; to forecast that it would act accordingly, having achieved this status by force, was no less realistic. This meant to all peoples of equitable access to markets and essential materials, armament reduction, massive economic rehabilitation, and the subversion of popular revolution. And at that moment, events and policy were taking a very different direction.

The possible outcome of such a course. The accuracy of Muste's forecast unfortunately requires little comment. Furthermore, a plausible case can be made for his analysis of the then existing situation, a matter of

To see how little the intellectual climate has changed, it is enough to consider the lengthy debate over the decision to drop the atomic bomb. That it was justified as a means of bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Only rarely has the question been raised whether there would not have been no protest over the air strikes we were conducting against Japan which led to such extraordinarily heavy losses of life; to have removed a counterweight to growing Chinese power, soon to become "Communist" power?

A fairly typical American view is probably that expressed by historian Louis Morton: In the late summer and autumn of 1945 the American people had every reason to rejoice. Germany and Japan had been defeated, and American troops, victorious everywhere, would soon be returning home. It is remarkable that such an attitude should be so blandly expressed and easily accepted. Is it true that in August 1945 the American people "had every reason to rejoice" -- at the sight of a Japanese countryside devastated by conventional bombing in which tens of thousands of civilians had been massacred, not to speak of the horrifying toll of two atom bombs (the second being, so it appears, history's most...act of barbarism, trivial in the context of what had just taken place, a thousand-plane raid launched after the Japanese surrender had been announced but, technically, before it was officially received? 10 To Secretary of War Stimson it seemed "appalling that there had been no protest over the air strikes we were conducting against Japan that led to such extraordinary destruction of life." What then are we to say of a country that still, twenty years later, is incapable of facing the question of war guilt?

The up to Germany is complete, even today, without a ritual sigh and wringing of hands over the failure of the German people to face the corruption of their nature. Just recently, a group of American liberal intellectuals gave their impressions of a tour of West Germany. In their emphases, we were plainly a group made coherent by our shared suspicions of Germany's capacity for political health ... we had the "dignity and fortitude" with which young Germans "carry an emotional and moral burden unmatched in history: they have
the naval forces of America, England, and Japan in the ratio of 5:5:3, accepting the American position of "equality of armaments." As Schroeder comments, "the American argument was that Japan, a state surrounded on all sides by the rest of the world, had the right to have a military force that could protect its national interests."

In good faith, Japan signed the Treaty of Versailles and agreed to renounce the "rights and interests" it had acquired in China, and to participate in the developing political structure of the League of Nations. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 laid down an international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers. In good faith, Japan renounced the "rights and interests" it had acquired in China, and participated in the developing political structure of the League of Nations. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 laid down an international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers.

The great European war of 1914-1918 gave Japan an opportunity to extend its "rights and interests" in China and provided new markets for expanding Japanese industry. The revival of European competition came as a severe blow, and postwar diplomacy attempted vainly to construct a new international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers. In good faith, Japan renounced the "rights and interests" it had acquired in China, and participated in the developing political structure of the League of Nations. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 laid down an international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers.

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Returning to Muste's radical pacifism in the context of 1941, recall that the first of his proposals was that there be no attempt "to fasten sole war-guilt on any nation." The second was that measures be taken to assure to all peoples equitable access to markets and essential materials. The revival of European competition came as a severe blow, and postwar diplomacy attempted vainly to construct a new international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers. In good faith, Japan renounced the "rights and interests" it had acquired in China, and participated in the developing political structure of the League of Nations. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 laid down an international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers.

The Kaiser Wilhelm II was credited with a letter to the Austrian Kaiser Franz Joseph in the early days of that war, wherein he stated as follows: "My soul is torn, but everything must be put to fire and sword; men of spirit reflecting a people as degenerate as the French, the war will be over in two months, whereas if I admit considerations of humanity, the policy of indiscriminate murder to shorten the war was considered to be a crime. In the Pacific war under our consideration, if the "right to self-defense" is put to fire and sword, so that the war will be more quickly finished -- and we act on this belief. Unlike the German Kaiser, our soul is not torn. We manage a relative calm, as we continue, today, to write new chapters of history with the blood of the helpless and innocent.

When we lament over the German conscience, we are demanding of them a display of self-hatred -- a good thing, no doubt. But for us the matter is infinitely more serious. It is not a matter of self-hatred regarding the sins of the past. Like the German Kaiser, we believe that everything must be put to fire and sword; men, women and children and old men must be slaughtered and not a tree or house be left standing. With these methods of terrorism, which are alone capable of affecting a people as degenerate as the French, the war will be over in two months, whereas if I admit considerations of humanity, the policy of indiscriminate murder to shorten the war was considered to be a crime. In the Pacific war under our consideration, if the "right to self-defense" is put to fire and sword, so that the war will be more quickly finished -- and we act on this belief. Unlike the German Kaiser, our soul is not torn. We manage a relative calm, as we continue, today, to write new chapters of history with the blood of the helpless and innocent.

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...
All sides by historic enemies and powerful rivals, had a superior natural situation for defense, while the United States, in the midst of two oceans without a powerful enemy on two continents, had defensively an inferior natural endowment.

The Treaty of 1930 involving Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. The matter is discussed in detail in a study by James Crowley. Subsequent negotiations was the question whether Japan could maintain its primary objective: "supremacy over the American fleet and naval power, nor did it endanger the safety of the United States or its insular possessions in the Pacific," but it did compromise "the unusual problems posed by the necessity of the United States to defend two coastlines and on the 'great concessions' which the American government had made at the time of the Washington Conference.

Crowley points out that "throughout the 1920's, Japan faithfully adhered to the terms of the Washington Conference treaties." At issue in the subsequent negotiations was the question...
of the 1920s was unlikely to secure the "rights and interests" regarded as essential for Japan's continued development. The effect on imperialist powers. Manchuria remained independent of the Kuomintang, but Chinese Nationalist pressures for unification were increasing.

Japan had a substantial investment in the South Manchurian Railway and, rightly or wrongly, regarded Manchuria as vital to its long-term development. The effects of the great depression were immediate and severe (see below). The London Naval Treaty of 1930 had significantly expanded its military capabilities. Manchuria remained independent of the Kuomintang, but Chinese Nationalist pressures for unification were increasing. At the same time, the Soviet Union had significantly expanded its military power on the Manchurian border, a fact that could not fail to concern the Japanese military. Japan had a substantial investment in the South Manchurian Railway and, rightly or wrongly, regarded Manchuria as an extremely important potential source of desperately needed raw materials.

Moreover, as thousands of Korean farmers encouraged by Japan had settled in Manchuria, inflaming Chinese nationalism and, simultaneously, deepening the commitment of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria to "preserve order." The future of the South Manchurian Railway -- and with it, the associated investments as well as the welfare of the Japanese and Korean immigrants and residents -- was very much in doubt, as Chinese pressures mounted both inside Manchuria and outside.

"Technically, under a 1905 protocol, China was barred from building any railway lines parallel to the South Manchurian Railway or from constructing any lines which might endanger the commercial traffic along it," but China was quite naturally disinclined to honor this provision, and Japanese attempts to conduct discussions on railroad construction were frustrated, as the Kuomintang pursued its course of attempting to incorporate Manchuria within China and to eliminate Japanese influence, no doubt with the support of the majority of the Manchurian population. A number of fairly serious incidents of violence occurred involving Korean settlers and the Japanese military. A Japanese officer was murdered in the summer of 1931. In Shanghai, a boycott of Japanese goods was initiated.

In their impact. According to the outstanding Japanese political scientist Masao Maruyama, "the energy of radical fascism stored up in the preparatory period now burst forth in full concentration under the combined pressure of domestic panic and international crises such as the Manchurian Incident, the Shanghai Incident, and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations." Furthermore, "the issue of the infringement of the supreme command," raised when the civilian leadership had overruled the military leaders and in effect capitulated to the West at the London Naval Conference, "was a great stimulus to the fascist movement" (p. 81). In 1932 a series of assassinations of important political figures contributed further to the decline of the Inukai government, and the central army authorities, Sadako Ogata demonstrates a considerable area of agreement:
the central army authorities insisted upon the creation of a new local regime with authority to negotiate ... sovereignty of the Chinese National Government, a traditional arrangement. This was the arrangement that the world at large was willing to accept. The Lytton Commission proposed the constitution of a special regime for the administration ... autonomy but under Chinese jurisdiction. Finally, when the State of Manchukuo declared its independence, the Government of Japan withheld formal recognition and thereby attempted to avoid a head-on collision with the powers, which by then had lined up behind the doctrine of non-recognition of changes caused by Japanese military action. The complete political reconstruction of Manchuria was achieved, then, at the hands of the Kwantung Army in defiance of the opposition of government and central military leaders. 28

The Lytton Commission report took cognizance of some of the complexities in the situation. The report drew the following conclusion:

"This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.

Both China and Japan "claim to have rights and interests, only some of which are clearly defined by international law; a territory which, although legally an integral part of China, had a sufficiently autonomous character to carry out direct negotiations with Japan on the matters which lay at the roots of this conflict." 29

The report went on to point out that the dispute arose in a territory in which both China and Japan "claim to have rights and interests, only some of which are clearly defined by international law; a territory which, although legally an integral part of China, had a sufficiently autonomous character to carry out direct negotiations with Japan on the matters which lay at the roots of this conflict." 29

It is an open question whether a more conciliatory American diplomacy that took into account some of the real problems faced by Japan might have helped the civilian government (backed by the central army authorities) to prevail over the independent initiative of the Kwantung Army, which ultimately succeeded in bringing the Japanese government to recognize the 

\textit{fait accompli} of a Manchukuo that was more a puppet of the Kwantung Army than of Japan proper.

The status of Manchuria set Japan and the United States on a collision course. Japan turned to an "independent diplomacy" and reliance on force to achieve its objectives. The Japanese position of the mid-thirties was to achieve a new order in East Asia which would be different from the one left by the Western powers. 30

Japan and China were in frequent disagreement with China and Manchukuo a new order comprising the three independent states. In accordance with this programme, East Asia would be free of any pressure from the hands of the Western powers. 30

The independence of the United States on the Open Door policy in China.

The American policy of "Open Door" in China, which attempted to play the game of international politics in accordance with the rules set by Western imperialist diplomacy Japanese society. The independent initiative of the Kwantung Army was largely that of the young officers of \textit{petit-bourgeois} origin, who were the expression of the radical reform movement that was originally inspired by Kita and Okawa,” 31 who had developed the view that Japan's mission was to "liberate" Asia.

The fundamental law proposed for Manchukuo, in 1932, protected the people from "usury, excessive profit, and all other unjust economic practices." 32 This program appealed to the Social Democrats, who blamed "Chinese warlords and selfish Japanese capitalists for the difficulties facing Manchuria." 33

The Kwantung Army never expected to establish Japanese supremacy, but rather proposed to leave "wide discretion to the local self-governing
program for autonomy was apparently influenced by and attempted to incorporate certain indigenous Chinese moves towards autonomy. This was an autonomous program for Manchuria based on cooperation of its six largest ethnic groups (Japanese, Chinese, Russians, Mongolians, Koreans, and Manchurians).

administrative organs was undertaken by utilizing the traditional self-governing bodies.... Yu Chung-han, a prominent elder statesman of the Mukden Government, was installed as chief of the Self-Government Guiding Board on November 10. Yu had been the leader of the civilian group in Manchuria which, in contrast to the warlords, had held to the principle of absolute Hokyo anmin (secure boundary and peaceful life). According to him, the protection and prosperity of the Northeastern Provinces assumed priority over all, including the relationship with China proper. Through tax reform, improvement of the wage system of government officials, and abolition of a costly army, the benefits of peaceful labor, while defense

- half of whom had immigrated since the initiation of Japanese development efforts a quarter of a century earlier -- as "suffering masses who had been sacrificed to the misrule of warlords and the avarice of wicked officials, masses deriving no benefits of civilization despite the natural abundance of the region." Furthermore, the Army regarded Manchuria as "the fortress against Russian southern advancement," for it felt that "Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and with the support of the Western democratic powers which wanted to keep China in a semi-colonial state safe from the continental advance of the Tibetans and Mongols would have simply resumed their own national sovereignty after the fall of the Manchu empire. To be sure, the establishment of Japanese hegemony over Manchuria -- and later, northern China as well -- was motivated by the desire to secure Japanese rights and interests. A liberal professor of American history, Yasaka Takagi, observes that the general support for the Japanese military in 1931 was similar to the Manifest Destiny psychology underlying American expansion into Florida, Texas, California, Cuba, and Hawaii. He describes the bandit-infested, warlord-controlled Manchurian region, then subject to the clash of expansionist Chinese Nationalism and Japanese imperialism, as similar to the Caribbean when the United States justified its Caribbean policy. He asks why there should be a Monroe Doctrine in America and an Open Door principle in Asia, and suggests an international conference define the Monroe Doctrine and review Mexican relations." He points out, quite correctly, that "by confirming a maximum area for China it increased the sphere of future Western investment and exploitation" (a fact which adds a touch of irony to current Western complaints about "Chinese expansionism). From this point of view, the independence of Manchukuo could easily be rationalized as a step towards the emancipation of the peoples of East Asia from Western dominance.

To be sure, the establishment of Japanese hegemony over Manchuria -- and later, northern China as well -- was motivated by the desire to secure Japanese rights and interests. A liberal professor of American history, Yasaka Takagi, observes that the general support for the Japanese military in 1931 was similar to the Manifest Destiny psychology underlying American expansion into Florida, Texas, California, Cuba, and Hawaii. He describes the bandit-infested, warlord-controlled Manchurian region, then subject to the clash of expansionist Chinese Nationalism and Japanese imperialism, as similar to the Caribbean when the United States justified its Caribbean policy. He asks why there should be a Monroe Doctrine in America and an Open Door principle in Asia, and suggests an international conference define the Monroe Doctrine and review Mexican relations." He points out, quite correctly, that "by confirming a maximum area for China it increased the sphere of future Western investment and exploitation" (a fact which adds a touch of irony to current Western complaints about "Chinese expansionism). From this point of view, the independence of Manchukuo could easily be rationalized as a step towards the emancipation of the peoples of East Asia from Western dominance.

Nevertheless, it appears that few Japanese were willing to justify the Manchurian incident and subsequent events on the "pragmatic" grounds of self-interest. Rather, they emphasized the high moral character of their "earthly paradise" in the independent state of Manchukuo (later, in China as well), defended from Communist attack by the power of Japan, more than anyone else they deceived themselves." To illustrate, he quotes the observations of American Ambassador Joseph Grew on the broken the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Covenant of the League. A comparatively few thinking men are capable of...
one of these instruments; we've waged open war; the arguments of 'self-defense' and 'self-determination for Manchuria' are not. But such men are in the minority. The great majority of Japanese are astonishingly capable of really fooling themselves.... It isn't that the Japanese necessarily has his tongue in his cheek when he signs the obligation. It merely means that when the obligation runs counter to his own interests, as he conceives them, he will reinterpret the obligation to suit himself and, according to his own lights and mentality, he will very likely be perfectly honest in so doing.... Such a mentality is a great deal harder to deal with than a mentality which, however brazen, knows that it is in the wrong.

In this respect, the analogy to current American behavior in Asia fails; more than one American in a hundred understands that we have actually violated our commitments, not only at Geneva but, more importantly, at The Hague. The mentality that reinterprets obligations to suit self-interest, and may very well be perfectly honest -- in some curious sense of the word -- is a great deal harder to deal with than a mentality which, however brazen, knows that it is in the wrong.

Alongside of those who justified the Manchurian intervention on the pragmatic grounds of self-interest, those who spoke of a new Monroe Doctrine "to maintain the peace of East Asia," and those who fantasied about an "earthly paradise," a third group affected the formation of the postwar Japanese system. These special interests had repeatedly been recognized by the United States. Both China and Japan regarded the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 as indicating "American acquiescence in the latter's position in Manchuria."

...
Western economic policies of the 1930s made an intolerable situation still worse, as was reported regularly in the

As late as 1930, the American minister to China saw no difference between the Kuomintang and the warlord rebels in Peking. At the same time, the United States insisted on preserving its special rights, including the right of extraterritoriality, which exempted American citizens from local justice, and the right to abduct or deport Chinese citizens. In 1928, there were more than 5,200 American consuls and marines in China protecting these rights (the Japanese army in Manchuria at the time was about 10,000 troops). The other imperialist powers were even more insistent on protecting their rights, and persisted in their anti-Nationalist attitudes right through the Manchurian incident.

The Japanese were completely shut out from the European colonies. In the Philippines, Indo-China, Borneo, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, not only were Japanese activities forbidden, but even entry. Ordinary trade was hampered by unnatural discriminatory treatment. The business community remained relatively pro-Japanese even after Japan wished to destroy foreign rights and privileges ... that if the organizing abilities of the Japanese were turned loose in China, they still retained the support of the American business community (as long as it did not itself feel threatened by the Japanese who wished to destroy foreign rights and privileges ... that if the organizing abilities of the Japanese were turned loose in China, they still retained the support of the American business community (as long as it did not itself feel threatened by the Japanese.

The report of the Banff conference of August 1933 noted that “the Indian Government, in an attempt to foster its own...Manchurian outbreak was the result of the international closed economies that followed on the first World War. There was a feeling at the back of it that it provided the only escape from economic strangulation. The depression of 1929 marked the final collapse of the attempt of Japanese civilians to live by the rules established by the Western powers. Just as the depression struck, the new Hamaguchi cabinet adopted the gold standard in an attempt to link the Japanese economy more closely with that of the West, foregoing the previous attempts at unilateral Sino-Japanese “co-prosperity.” An immediate consequence was a drastic decline in Japanese exports. In 1931, Japan was replaced by the United States as the major exporter to China. Japanese exports to the United States also declined severely, in part as a result of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of June 1930, in part because of the dramatic fall in the price of silk. For an industrialized country such as Japan, with almost no domestic supplies of raw materials, the decline in world trade was an unmitigated disaster.

The Japanese were fighting the battle of all foreigners against the Chinese who wished to destroy foreign rights and privileges. The United States insisted on preserving its special rights, including the right of extraterritoriality, which exempted American citizens from local justice, and the right to abduct or deport Chinese citizens. In 1928, there were more than 5,200 American consuls and marines in China protecting these rights (the Japanese army in Manchuria at the time was about 10,000 troops). The other imperialist powers were even more insistent on protecting their rights, and persisted in their anti-Nationalist attitudes right through the Manchurian incident.

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the effects of which were of course felt chiefly by Japanese traders, whose markets in India had been growing rapidly." 59 "Japan, which is a rapidly growing industrial nation, has a special need for... resources... and is faced with a serious shortage of iron, steel, oil, and a number of important industrial minerals under her domestic control, while, on the other hand, the greater part of the supplies of tin and rubber, not only of the Pacific area but for the whole world, are, by historical arrangements aimed at constructing an essentially closed, autarchic system; the contemporary American policy of self-sufficiency proceeded in a similar direction. The only recourse available to Japan was to try to mimic this behavior in Manchuria. Liberalism was all very well when Britannia ruled the waves, but not when Lancashire industry was grinding to a halt, unable to meet Japanese competition. The Open Door policy was appropriate to an expanding capitalist economy; but, by 1932, Japanese exports of cotton piece-goods for the first time exceeded those of Great Britain. The Indian tariff, mentioned above, was 75 percent on Japanese cotton goods and 25 percent on British goods. The Ottawa conference of 1932 effectively blocked Japanese trade with the Commonwealth, including India. As the IPR conference report noted, "Ottawa had dealt a blow to Japanese liberalism."

When an effort to set a quota on imports of bleached and colored cotton cloths failed, President Roosevelt finally took direct action. In May of 1936 he invoked the flexible provision of the tariff law and ordered an average increase of 42 percent in the duty on these categories of imports. By this date Japan's cotton goods had begun to suffer from restrictive measures taken by more than half of their other markets. Japanese xenophobia was further stimulated as tariff barriers [rose] against Japan, which Japan could control politically; an argument for further political expansion ... against an iron ring of tariffs. 64 The textile industry, which was hit most severely by the discriminatory policies of the major imperialist powers, produced nearly half of the total value of manufactured goods and about two thirds of the value of Japanese exports, and employed about half of the factory workers. Though industrialized by Asian standards, Japan had only about one seventh the energy capacity per capita of Germany; from 1927 to 1932, it did not produce enough coal to meet the needs of Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines erected tariff barriers favoring the mother country, and could not survive the deterioration in its very substantial trade with the United States and the sharp decline in the China trade. It was, in fact, being suffocated by the American and British and other Western imperial systems, which quickly abandoned their lofty liberal rhetoric as soon as the shoe began to pinch.

When the two countries, should recognize the freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China; and China should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia; that a new order was to be established, which would defend China and Japan against Western imperialism, unequal treaties, and extraterritoriality. Its goal...
it would succeed in freeing itself from dependence on the West for strategic raw materials.

To use the contemporary idiom, they emphasized that their actions were "not intended as a threat to China" and that Japan was quite willing to negotiate with the recalcitrant Chinese authorities, and even sought third-power intervention. 68 Such Japanese leaders as Tojo and Matsuoka emphasized that no one, surely, could accuse Japan of seeking mere economic gain. In fact, she was spending more on the war in China than she could possibly gain in return. Japan was "paying the price that leadership of Asia demands," they said, attempting to reassure the Chinese that the United Front and the Sino-Soviet pact of 1937 were steps toward the destruction of Nationalist China and the Bolshevization of Asia. When the "illegal acts" by Communists and other lawless elements were terminated, 71 and the safety and rights of Japanese and Korean residents in China guaranteed.

For example, Secretary of State Kellogg had stated United States government policy as: "to require China to perform the obligations of a sovereign state in the protection of foreign citizens and their property" (September 2, 1925). The Washington Treaty powers were "prepared to consider the Chinese government's proposal for the modification of existing treaties in measure as the Chinese authorities demonstrated the desire to enforce respect for the laws of those treaties," and admonished China of "the necessity of giving concrete evidence of its ability and willingness to enforce respect for its laws and the treaties" (note of September 4, 1925). 72 Because of this "inability and unwillingness," "none of the Treaty of Washington signatories gave effect to the treaty with respect to extra-territorial rights, intervening in internal Chinese affairs, tariffs, courts, etc., on grounds that their interests were prejudiced by lawlessness and the ineffectiveness of the government of China." 73

With all of the talk about benevolence and generosity, it is doubtful that Japanese spokesmen ever surpassed the level of fatuity that characterizes much of American scholarship, which often seems mired in materialism or war-mongering. In fact, we have used our wealth to help other countries and our military strength to defend the independence of China.

A wave of revulsion swept through the world as the brutality of the Japanese attack on China became known. When notified of the intention of the Japanese government to bomb Nanking, the United States responded as follows: "The Government is of the opinion that any bombardment of an extensive zone containing a sizeable population engaged in their peaceful pursuits is inadmissible and runs counter to the principles of law and humanity." 76 Now that these principles have been repealed, it would be the ultimate in hypocrisy for an American today to describe these events in the manner they deserve. For this reason I will say very little about them.

In Manchuria, the Japanese conducted a fairly successful counterinsurgency operation, beginning in 1931. 77 The record is instructive. In 1932, Wangtao [the perfect way of the ancient kings, or the kingly way] had at one point reached 300,000, but the earnest and brave efforts of various subjugating agencies headed by the Japanese army brought about great results. Thus the number of insurgents declined from 120,000 in 1933, to 50,000 in 1934; 40,000 in 1935; 30,000 in 1936; and 20,000 in 1937. As of September, 1938, the number of insurgents is estimated at 10,000.

The success was achieved in part by contingents of Japanese troops, in part by the national army of Manchukuo, and in part by the police. "Because of the success of these activities [which led to the winning of the support of the masses], the insurgent groups are now in an extremely precarious condition and the attainment of peace seems to be in sight." The "native bandits" and "rebellious troops from the local armies" had been absorbed by the Chinese Communist party during this period, and...
The goal of the insurgents was "to destroy the government's pacification efforts" and to win public confidence and disturb public opinion. Through a combination of pacification and propaganda activities, their efforts were being countered and, the report continues, the insurmountable task of pacifying the masses astray by opposing Manchukuo and Japan and espousing Communism. Their efforts lead the masses astray on various matters and significantly hamper the development of natural resources and the improvement of the people's livelihood."

The use of military force against the insurgents is the principal means of attaining peace and order, in that it will directly reduce the number of insurgents. But this method is to be used only as a last resort; the most appropriate means suitable for a righteous government is that of liberating the masses from old notions implanted by a long period of exploitative rule by military cliques and feudalistic habits and of dispelling the illusions created by Communist ideology. Furthermore, the philosophy of the state calls for a proper understanding by the masses of the true nature of righteous government, the reasons behind the establishment of the state, and the current state of affairs. The insurgents should be given an opportunity to alter their misconceived notions and to become good citizens. This is why the operation for the inducement of surrender has such grave significance.

At the end of 1937, the Police Affairs Headquarters reported that over 10,000 hamlets had been organized accommodating 5,500,000 people. The collective hamlets, Lee informs us, were set up with considerable success. Communist groups were heavily infiltrated and alienation was created within the guerrilla groups. The formerly anti-Japanese Korean community was won over by "sociopolitical and accompanying psychological changes" ("revolutionary development," in modern phraseology), specifically, by offering them "the possibility of owning land and escaping from the control of their Chinese landlords" (Lee, p. 23). Among the Chinese, the situation was different, and more difficult.

The obvious answer to this problem was a system of "collective hamlets." By the end of 1937, the Police Affairs Headquarters reported that over 10,000 hamlets had been organized accommodating 5,500,000 people. The collective hamlets provided the guerrillas both with the necessary supplies and with vital intelligence. Farmers who were located in regions too remote to be protected by the Manchukuo authorities and the Japanese were forced to comply with the guerrillas' demands, even if they had no desire to assist the insurgent cause. [Lee, p. 25]

Families were ordered to move from their farm homes with little or no notice, even if the collective hamlets were not ready. Some farmers were forced to move just before the sowing season, making it impossible for them to plant any seeds that year, while others were ordered to move just before harvest. Many farmhouses seem to have been destroyed by troops engaged in mop-up operations before preparations had been made for the farmers' relocation. The only concern of the military was to cut off the guerrillas' sources of food supply and their contacts with the farmers.

There is no point in supplying further details, which will be familiar to anyone who has been reading the American press since 1962. The collective-hamlet program was fairly successful, though it was necessary to prevent insurgents from "assaulting the weakly protected collective hamlets and ... plundering food and grain" and to prevent insurgents from "assaulting the collective hamlets," and the Communists continued to exploit the farmers' grievances with skill (Lee, pp. 33 f.). Vice-Governor Itagaki formulated the problem succinctly: "We are not afraid of Communist propaganda; but we are
We are not afraid of the ignition of fire; rather we are afraid of the seeping oil” (p. 34).

The Japanese undertook a number of what are now called “population control methods,” including registration of residents, issuance of residence certificates, unscheduled searches, and so on. They also made use of the method of reward and punishment recommended by more recent government-sponsored organization to recruit mass support for the Manchukuo regime” (p. 46). Many abuses at the village level were rooted in the fact that propaganda efforts were conducted to win the hearts and minds of the villagers (cf. pp. 55 f.). In comparison with American efforts at pacification, the Japanese were committed to guaranteeing the persistence of the old semi-feudal order and was less solicitous of property rights. The reports indicated that the Japanese understood that “it was totally unrealistic to expect reforms or innovations to be initiated by those who were already well off” and therefore replaced the former “local gentry” by “young and capable administrative personnel” who were “trained to assist the local administrators through the Hsueh-ho-hui, the government-sponsored organization to recruit mass support for the Manchukuo regime.”

April 1939 describes the achievements of pacification in Tunghwa Province in glowing terms:

Activities on the citizens of the province has been very uplifting. We have observed an increase in the areas under cultivation as a result of improvement in market facilities; remarkable progress among merchants and industrialists assisted by government loans; and general improvement in the standard of living. Extensive propaganda efforts were conducted to win the hearts and minds of the villagers (cf. pp. 55 f.). In comparison with American efforts at pacification, the Japanese appear to have achieved considerable success — if these documents can be believed — in part, apparently, because Japan was not committed to guaranteeing the persistence of the old semi-feudal order and was less solicitous of property rights. The reports indicate that the Japanese understood that “it was totally unrealistic to expect reforms or innovations to be initiated by those who were already well off” and therefore replaced the former “local gentry” by “young and capable administrative personnel” who were “trained to assist the local administrators through the Hsueh-ho-hui, the government-sponsored organization to recruit mass support for the Manchukuo regime.”

A secret report of November 1939 describes the situation in a province where “revolutionary development” was not yet quite so successful and insurgents still operated:

Though some continued to “sympathize with Communism.” However, plans were being laid to “establish confidence” and destroy insurgents. The Japanese must continue to use limited means to secure law and order and to permit the responsible elements of Manchuria, though the more reasonable presumably continued to discuss the situation in balanced and unemotional terms, taking note of the violence carried out on both sides. If there were vocal advocates of Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria, they could be shown reports of the sort just quoted, and was told that the Japanese officers in charge. Vice-Governor Itagaki described the moral dilemma that they faced in moving words:
the emerging American world system. Japan chose war -- as we now know, with no expectation of victory over the United States. At this point, "Japan was denied access to all the vitally needed supplies outside her own control." The expiration of the treaty was the turning point that led many moderates towards support for the Axis powers.

However, external interference made it impossible to carry through this program. With far greater power to enforce their efforts and a much smaller and weaker enemy, American political scientists were not unreasonable in looking forward to greater success.

In Manchuria, the problem of the terrorists and Communist bandits seems to have been solved by 1940. In China itself, pacification continued throughout the Pacific war. Chalmers Johnson summarizes these efforts in the following terms in a recent Japanese commentary:

**"Chinghsiang" (Clean Hamlet) operations in Soochow in Central China and its "Ailutsun" (Railway Defense Village) program in Shangtung Province in North China... The concept was the concentration of military, economic and ideological effort on a single village, in building it up into a peaceful, stabilized and secure area; then by using this village as a model, gradually extending security and stability to cover the whole "hsien" (county), the whole province and eventually the whole country.**

...the Japanese Army tried its "Chinghsiang" (Clean Hamlet) operations in Soochow in Central China and its "Ailutsun" (Railway Defense Village) program in Shangtung Province in North China. **The concept of "Chinghsiang" lies in making the village or hamlet the basis for reforming and securing the countryside.** The former policy was far more successful, and it was implemented everywhere except Manchuria.

The construction of the defense hamlets must be enforced -- with tears. We issue small subsidy funds and severe orders [to the farmers], telling them to move to a designated location by such and such a date. Then they come in rags and smiling on carts that are carrying the household goods away. A few days ago, a girl of sixteen or seventeen made me wonder if I had taken the usual line that went: "Who is your councilor?" She had walked a long way to town thinking, "If I asked the councilor, something could be done." Watching the bony hands and faces at the forefront who have to guide the coercive operation directly is beyond imagination. I was told many times while I was on my inspection tours: "We don't need to use our hands. We don't need to grind our teeth. kaoliang gin, sounded as though someone was spitting blood. In each case we had to console and keep telling each other that this was the last hill that needed to be conquered. The program was forced through mercilessly, inhumanely, without emotion -- as if driving a horse. As a result, more than 100 defense hamlets were constructed throughout the prefecture. These were built with blood, tears, and sweat. 84

So events proceeded through the terrifying decade of the 1930s. Seeking desperately for allies, Japan joined with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact at a moment when Germany appeared invincible. With control of French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, and for gaining "independence" for the Philippines. The expiration of the treaty was the moment when Germany appeared invincible. With the termination of the Japanese-American commercial treaty in January 1940, the United States insisted on making the Axis alliance a major issue, though Japan persistently de-emphasized it. Schroeder argues that the American motive was in part "selling the forthcoming American involvement in the European war. In any event, the American motive was in part "selling the forthcoming American involvement in the European war." It may be that the underlying motive was to justify the forthcoming American involvement in the European war. With the termination of the Japanese-American commercial treaty in January 1940, the United States insisted on making the Axis alliance a major issue, though Japan persistently de-emphasized it. Schroeder argues that the American motive was in part "selling the forthcoming American involvement in the European war."
On November 7, 1941, Japan offered to accept "the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations" in the Pacific, including China, if this principle "were adopted throughout the world." The qualification was, needless to say, quite unthinkable. Hull's final demand was that the principle be applied in the Japanese occupied areas and that Japan withdraw all forces from China and Indochina. The Western powers could not be expected to respond in kind in their dominions. A few days later came "the day that will live in infamy."

This final exchange points clearly to what had been, for decades, the central problem. Japan had insisted that in its plans for "coprosperity" and then a "new order," it was simply following the precedent established by Great Britain and the United States; it was establishing its own Monroe Doctrine and realizing its Manifest Destiny. It is revealing to study the American response to this claim. Hull professed to be shocked. In his view of the matter, the Monroe Doctrine, "as we interpret and apply it uniformly since 1823 only contemplates steps for our physical safety," whereas "it has exercised its powers of military intervention or of financial administration for the benefit of the peoples of the Caribbean States does not appear natural for Japan to take toward China."

American scholars were equally offended by the analogy. W. W. Willoughby, in a detailed analysis, concludes that no comparison can be made between the Monroe Doctrine and Japan's plans. The United States, he asserts, has never resorted to the Monroe Doctrine to demand "that it be given special commercial or other economic privileges in the other American States." Rather, "it has exercised its powers of military intervention or of financial administration for the benefit of the peoples of the Caribbean republics, each with a relatively small area and population. Japan, on the other hand, is a country with a relatively small area and population vis-à-vis the vast territory and great population of China. An attitude which therefore appears natural for the United States to take toward the Caribbean States does not appear natural for Japan to take toward China.

This contribution to the history of imperialist apologia at least has the merit of originality. To my knowledge, no one had previously argued that attempts by one nation to dominate another are proper to the extent that the victim is smaller and weaker than the power that is bent on subjugating it. However, this argument is perhaps surpassed in acuity by Blakeslee's next explanation of the fundamental error in the Japanese analogy:

The United States does not need to use military force to induce the Caribbean republics to permit American capital to find profitable investment. The doors are voluntarily wide open. The Grau government was "highly prejudicial to our interest ... our own commercial and export interests" (Welles to Hull, October 4, 1933). The Grau government soon fell, with the result that "the pre-1930 social and economic class structure was retained, and the important place in the Cuban economy held by foreign enterprises was restored."

But the basic inadequacy of the Japanese analogy, as Blakeslee points out, is the difference in aims. The United States...
ations of stability and prosperity. The United States does not wish to seize territory, directly or indirectly, or to assume political or economic control. And when it has seemed necessary to intervene in some revolution-tossed land, it has effected the necessary reorganization and has then withdrawn.

Their appeal to the precedent of American practice is entirely without worth. The matter is simply put in a recent study of postwar Japanese history: "...We engaged in a kind of welfare imperialism, empire-building for noble ends rather than for such base motives as profit and influence. We have not exploited our empire. ... have we not been generous with our clients and allies, sending them vast amounts of money and even sacrificing the lives of our own soldiers on their behalf? Of course we have." 99

Japan stands exposed as the kind of "unprecedented evil" that fully merited the atom bomb.

In comparison with this long-standing record of benevolence, Japanese aggression stands exposed as the kind of "unprecedented evil" that fully merited the atom bomb.

This review obviously does not exhaust the issues. But it does serve, I think, to place in context the policy alternatives that were open to the United States in 1941 and in earlier years. The predominant American opinion, expressed by, for example, Dean Acheson and Henry L. Stimson, was that the United States adhered, but only our insistence on abiding by these principles at an inappropriate time.

In contrast to the alternatives of "realism" and "moralism," so defined, the revolutionary pacifism of Muste seems to me both eminently realistic and highly moral. Furthermore, even if we were to grant the claim that the United States engaged in "meting out justice," one must ask: "Who means one uses inevitably incorporate themselves into his ends and, if evil, will defeat him." Whether Muste's was in fact the most realistic and moral position at the time may be debated, but I think there is no doubt that its remoteness from the American consciousness was a great tragedy. The lack of a radical critique of the sort that Muste, and a few others, sought to develop was one of the factors that contributed to the atrocity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the weakness and ineffectiveness of such radical critique today will doubtless lead to new and unimaginable horrors.


Kennedy administration in this crisis, it is the attitude that remains, long after the crisis has cooled, that this was Kennedy's "finest hour," in which he demonstrated his skill at the game of "nuclear chicken" (cf. historian Thomas Bailey, *The Historian and the Diplomat* (New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 123-69. Morton goes on to develop the conventional view that the Soviet Union is solely to blame for the dimming of "the bright hopes for the future," by "the subtle challenge of political subversion and economic penetration" (unthinkable to the West, of course), and by support of revolution, as in Greece, "in violation of allied wartime agreements that had placed Greece in the western sphere of interest." As to the latter, he does not discuss the considerable evidence that indicates, rather, that Stalin was opposed to the Greek rebellion and adhered to the Churchill-Stalin settlement that divided Europe into spheres of influence, in which the Eastern European countries were in the Russian sphere in the Churchill-Stalin agreement, "are not to be spheres of influence of any one power." Nor is there any reference to Spaatz's essay as "an always intelligent account of the role of history and historians in the era of the cold war," which "will disappoint those looking for a new synthesis in the writing of American history by the decision to oppose Communist aggression after 1945."

*War II* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953), Vol. 5, pp. 732-33:

To area in a 1,000-plane mission: the Twentieth Air Force had put up 853 B-29's and 79 fighters on 1 August, and Arnold thought this was too many a poor target for conventional bombing; instead, he proposed to divide his forces between seven targets. Arnold was apologetic about the unfortunate mixup on the 11th and, accepting Spaatz' amendment, assured him that his orders had been "co-ordinated with my superiors all the way to the top." The teleconference ended with a fervid "Thank God" from Spaatz.... From the Marianas, 449 B-29's went out for the 14th; the seven planes dispatched on special bombing missions by the 509th Group brought the number of B-20's to 828, and with 186 fighters, USASTAF exceeded Arnold's goal with a total of 1,014 aircraft. There were no losses, and before the last B-29 returned President Truman announced the unconditional surrender of Japan.


In the afternoon of August 14, 1945, thousands of people died during a protracted and intensive aerial bombardment of an arsenal in Osaka. I was a witness to the tragedy. I saw dozens of corpses -- loyal subjects literally consumed by service to a government which had already decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration's demand for unconditional surrender. The only reason these people died was because they happened to have been in the arsenal or environs at the time of the air raid. After which American bombers had dropped over the destruction. The leaflets proclaimed in Japanese, "Your Government has surrendered. The war is over!"


He goes on to argue that it was Japanese inexperience that led to passivity and acceptance of the American attempt, with British backing, to attain hegemony in the region. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 17.


American destruction of cities of the Mekong Delta in early February 1968, for example, the destruction of Ben Tre with thousands of civilian casualties to protect 20 American soldiers (20 had been killed, in a garrison of 40), after the city had been taken over, virtually without a fight, by the NLF forces.

Shigemitsu describes the Manchurian incident as, in effect, one aspect of an attempted coup, of which the domestic aspect was the “revolutionary diplomacy” of China. By 1930, the “revolutionary diplomacy” of China was attempting to reverse and overthrow the unequal treaties, including the Boxer Protocol, and blocking trade between Japan and the colonial possessions of the European powers, and the League of Nations was following the recommendations of the committee of experts for the demilitarization of Manchuria. Later steps to defend Manchukuo were determined in part by the threat of ultimate Communist occupation, and that the Japanese must attempt “to attain self-sufficiency.” This view of the situation, to which I return below, was not unrealistic.

Maruyama adds that “while there is no doubt that the Manchurian Incident acted as a definite stimulus to Japanese fascism, it must be emphasized that the fascist
fascism in Japan was a great concern for the suffering of the poor farmers, particularly after the great depression struck. See Maruyama, p. 138.

It should be added that among the complex roots of fascism in Japan was a great concern for the suffering of the poor farmers, particularly after the great depression struck. See Maruyama, p. 138.

Comparisons are difficult, but it seems that the Japanese were considerably more successful in establishing a functioning puppet government in Manchuria than the United States has ever been in Vietnam, just as the Germans were more successful in converting French nationalist forces to their ends in occupied and Vichy France than the United States has been in Vietnam. On the insurgency that developed in Manchuria, and the Japanese attempts to suppress it, see below.

Another crucial factor, according to Maruyama (p. 124), was "the counsel of the Senior Retainers close to the Emperor, who had chosen war abroad in preference to class struggle at home, and who were then less afraid of losing that war than of risking revolution" -- also a familiar pattern.

Senior Retainers close to the Emperor, who had chosen war abroad in preference to class struggle at home, and who were then less afraid of losing that war than of risking revolution. See Maruyama, p. 124.

The situation was further complicated by the grounds that it would then be impossible "to face the myriad spirits of the war dead" (General Matsui, 1941, cited by Maruyama, p. 124).


In addition, there were those who opposed any compromise or concession on the grounds that it would then be impossible "to face the myriad spirits of the war dead" (General Matsui, 1941, cited by Maruyama, p. 124).

The situation was further complicated by the grounds that it would then be impossible "to face the myriad spirits of the war dead" (General Matsui, 1941, cited by Maruyama, p. 124).
late 1937, the Japanese had 160,000 troops in China. One tends to forget, these days, what was the scale of fascist aggression a generation ago.

The United States and Japan's New Order (New York, Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 124, 126. The Lansing-Ishii Notes, however, contained a secret protocol which canceled this concession.

General Matsui, departing to take up his post as commander-in-chief of the Japanese expeditionary force in Shanghai in 1937, stated: "I am going to the front not to fight an enemy but in the state of mind of one who sets out to pacify his brother." At the Tokyo Tribunal he defined his task in the following words: "The struggle between Japan and China was always a fight between brothers within the 'Asian family.'... It has been because we love them, but on the contrary because we love them too much. It is just the same as in a family when an elder brother has taken all that he can stand from his ill-behaved younger brother and has to chastise him.

The racist American immigration law of 1924 had been a particularly bitter blow to the Japanese. In addition there were immigration barriers in Canada, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand. It is worthy of mention that the Japanese effort to insert a racial-equality paragraph into the League of Nations resolutions endorsing the "principle of equality of Nations" and "just treatment of their nationals" had been blocked by Britain. Woodrow Wilson, then in the chair, ruled that it should not be instituted "in view of the serious obstacles." Only Britain and the United States failed to vote for this resolution. See Neumann, op. cit., pp. 153-54.
American postwar Philippine policy served to perpetuate what United Nations representative Salvador López calls the prewar "system rooted in injustice and greed" which "required the riveting of the Philippine economy to the American economy through free trade arrangements between the two countries," and which, in "tacit allegiance with the Filipino economic elite" led to a "colonial economy of the classical type." Furthermore, this "shortsighted policy of pressing for immediate commercial advantage" interrupted the Philippine revolution that was under way at the time of the American conquest. This "interruption" continued, for example, with the policies of Magsaysay, who "cleared away the ambivalence which had arisen in the persistent experimentation with public corporations of various kinds by a firm avowal that public policy would reflect faith in and dependence upon private enterprise" (Frank H. Golay, ed., [Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966], pp. 7-31). Furthermore, this "improvement" in "the political and economic aspects of the investment climate" was that from 1957 to 1963 "earnings accruing to American foreign investors were in excess of twice the amount of direct foreign investment in the Philippines," an interesting case of foreign aid. In fact, the preferential trade relations forced on the Philippines in 1946 virtually guaranteed American domination of the payments. In view of the prevailing economic circumstances, Filipinos had no alternative but to accept, after considerable controversy, the payments ... in effect went back to the United States in the form of payments for imports, to the benefit of American industry and labor. Two Filipino economists, writing in the same volume, point out that "acceptance of the Trade Act by the Philippines was the price for war damage payments. In view of the prevailing economic circumstances, Filipinos had no alternative but to accept, after considerable controversy, the payments ... in effect went back to the United States in the form of payments for imports, to the benefit of American industry and labor." (p. 132). But the "compensating" rehabilitation act was itself something of a fraud, since "the millions of dollars of war damage payments ... in effect went back to the United States in the form of payments for imports, to the benefit of American industry and labor." (p. 125).

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The United States was the least offender in this regard, abandoning its control over Chinese tariffs in 1928. Germany and the Soviet Union had relinquished extraterritoriality in the 1920s (the United States did so in 1942). Japan relinquished these rights in the puppet state of Manchuria, October 1938 (Lee, op. cit., pp. 189 f.). The kill ratio is omitted.

In 1928, Thorp, formerly Assistant Secretary of State and member of the UN delegation, and at the time a professor of economics at Amherst, also draws the remarkable conclusion, in 1956, that one of the major international problems is the demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to support aggression in Indochina. The conference whose proceedings he was editing concluded finally with the hope that "the Chinese people will one day regain their liberties and again be free" (p. 225), but did not specify when the people of China had previously possessed their liberties and lived in freedom.


April 1939, entitled: "Pacification Activities in the Communist Bandit Area (Personal Reflections)" (Lee, op. cit., pp. 217 f.). Shizuo Maruyama, in his analysis of the "theory and psychology of ultranationalism": "Acts of benevolence could coexist with atrocities, and even with the same hands. Again, the reader will have no difficulty in supplying contemporary examples.

Garrisons and Governments (San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 86-87. The prospects for the American program are dim for a number of reasons, among them the following: "... the wounds inflicted on Nature, so ruthlessly destroyed for this, are too brutal to see. Beautiful grasslands, the verdant forests and the rich crops have all been burned by flame..."
throwers, napalm bombs and chemical defoliants. The great earth has been gouged and dug over. The ugly land, no longer green, has lost its power to attract people and to stir deep in the hearts of people a love for their birthplace and their motherland. "There is, he feels, little chance that revolutionary development will succeed "when Nature has been turned into a scorched earth and the system and the traditions born of a race of people have been destroyed."


According to Ike, op. cit., p. 108, the order to freeze assets was given on the evening of July 25, the announcement that troops would be moved south at noon on the 26th. The reasons for the delay in transmission of Roosevelt's offer to the Japanese Foreign Ministry are obscure. It appears that there was still some room for diplomatic maneuver at this time.

Ike states "today is in a position to wreck completely the economic structure of the Japanese empire," and Admiral Stark as predicting that the United States "today is in a position to wreck completely the economic structure of the Japanese empire," and Admiral Stark as predicting that:

Fewer matches
Imperialist War for the Pacific:  
The True Story of Pearl Harbor

Revolutionary Worker #1105, June 3, 2001, posted at http://rwor.org

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the news passed quickly across the U.S. and around the world that the Japanese navy had attacked part of the U.S. fleet, anchored at its Pearl Harbor base in Hawai'i. In two intense hours, Japanese aircraft sank four aging U.S. battleships and other vessels.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt immediately called for the U.S. to enter the second world war--and argued that this was an American war of self defense against the treachery and expansionism of Japan. Roosevelt said: "Our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger... I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire."

This myth--born within hours of those first bombs--is being retold this week onscreen with the release of Pearl Harbor. In this new movie, the U.S. is portrayed as a "sleeping giant"--where only a few military "hawks" could see the real threat. According to this military parable, the population of the U.S. was soft, passive, and dangerously preoccupied in the diversions of their daily lives, while a ruthless enemy plotted to take advantage of their lack of vigilance.

The message of this "summer blockbuster" is as subtle as an airborne torpedo. The propaganda is crude and pro-imperialist: "Don't get too self-absorbed in your little lives," this movie is saying, "because the U.S. operates in a very dangerous world, and you, too, may be called upon to kill for this flag."

And exactly because it would be so wrong to fight for U.S. dominance--and make heroes out of airborne government killers--we need to peel away this myth of Pearl Harbor and World War 2, and tell the true story of what that battle and that war were all about.

Whose Territory?

"We have pacified some thousands of islanders and buried them; destroyed their fields; burned their villages and turned their widows and orphans out-of-doors; furnished heartbreak by exile to some dozens of disagreeable patriots; subjugated the remaining tens of millions by Benevolent Assimilation, which is the pious new name of the musket...and hoisted our protecting flag... And so, by these Providences of God--and the phrase is the government's, not mine--we are a World Power."

Mark Twain, after the 1901 U.S. conquest of the Philippines

"Our general diplomatic and strategic position would be considerably weakened--by our loss of Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets (and by our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self-sufficient) as well as by insurmountable restrictions upon our access to the rubber, tin, jute, and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions."

State Department memorandum on how Japan's moves affected U.S. imperialist interests, 1940

The men who ruled the U.S. were not surprised when war broke out in 1941. They had prepared for it, even dreamed about it, for long years.
Over 40 years before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. had made its first massive armed moves into the western Pacific. In 1899, the U.S. sent half its military forces to conquer the Philippines and caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos in three years of bloody warfare to crush their resistance.

And before the U.S. imperialists could even start this colonial move, they had set up forward military bases for themselves scattered across the vast Pacific--to store the new steel navy that would carry out their conquests. That is why they seized Hawai'i from the Hawaiian people. The lands of Hawaiians were stolen and turned into plantations. Their culture attacked and disdained by missionaries. Finally, in 1893, their home government was overthrown and their islands annexed. In the U.S. Congress, the argument was made: "In the possession of the United States it will give us the command of the Pacific."

But the U.S. was not alone in its plans to seize the wealth and labor of southeast Asia. The British, French and Dutch imperialists had already invaded and carved out rich colonies for themselves--in Indonesia, Indochina, and Malaysia. And everyone knew that Japan, which was emerging as a newly industrial nation, would be working to seize for itself secure sources of rubber, oil, and labor.

For decades, rivalry raged over which oppressor power would rule what in east Asia. In 1922, the U.S. and Britain imposed restrictions on Japanese navy building--fixing a 5/5/3 ratio for larger classes of warships. This treaty, and the use of U.S. gunboats and troops against Chinese people that same year, was a declaration that the U.S. intended to seize a position of power in east Asia through military force, if necessary.

The U.S. called for a joint imperialist rape of China (the so-called "Open Door Policy"), so when Japan started to seize major chunks of China as its exclusive colonial possessions, the hostility between the U.S. and Japan escalated.

When Roosevelt said, after Pearl Harbor, that "our territory" was "in great danger," this talk of defending "our territory" is really a defense of U.S. imperialist interests. Hawai'i was not "sacred American soil"--it had recently been seized (from its own people!) at gunpoint. And those warships that lay at anchor in Pearl Harbor were an aggressive imperialist navy--built, deployed and based in Hawai'i precisely to threaten east Asia with U.S. military might.

After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government deliberately inflamed fears of invasion to rally a reluctant population by claiming the war and their sacrifice were for self-defense. The authorities created coast watches and blackouts. President Roosevelt fanned the hysteria, and signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, putting 110,000 Japanese-Americans into concentration camps. In the movie Pearl Harbor there is laughable talk about Japanese troops penetrating all the way to Chicago. In fact, the Japanese were seeking to take and hold China and southeast Asia, not Oklahoma, and everyone knew it.

The U.S. was also not waging a war about liberating anyone: Japan was an imperialist power that carried out extreme and oppressive acts--including the infamous Rape of Nanking and the colonial conquest of neighboring countries. But when General MacArthur said "I shall return"--he was talking about U.S. troops returning to the Philippines and re-imposing U.S. domination there at any cost--a domination that itself had been created through extreme and oppressive acts.

U.S. society had just gone through the Great Depression of the 1930s, where the heartlessness and madness of capitalism had been displayed for all to see. The U.S. military and navy were viciously Jim Crow--as was the larger society they were defending. And the oppression of Black people was there at every level, including to the point of mass murder in Port Chicago.

Meanwhile, this U.S. war for the Pacific was a war about O.P.T.--Other People's Territory. The U.S. prepared and waged a colonial war over who would get to exploit the people of east Asia and the larger Pacific. This was a war about whether the corrupt Marcos-type governments of post-war Asia would
speak English or Japanese.

**Whose Surprise?**

"Both groups of belligerent nations were systematically preparing the very kind of war such as the present. The question of which group dealt the first military blow or first declared war is immaterial in any determination of the tactics of socialists. Both sides' phrases on the defense of the fatherland, resistance to enemy invasion, a war of defense, etc., are nothing but deception of the people."

V.I. Lenin

Lenin's point about World War 1 describes the conflict shaping up between the U.S. and Japan 20 years later in the 1930s.

The U.S. imperialists knew war was coming and, by the late 1930s, the problem for the U.S. ruling class was how the inevitable war should break out. There was deep-seated opposition to the war within the U.S. population—those who were not interested in dying in distant war in Europe. And there were powerful forces within the ruling class who felt that the U.S. should stay with the policy that served it so well through the first two years of the world war—what Mao called "sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight."

But by 1941, the Roosevelt government was convinced that the time had come to step in. The various other great powers were badly bloodied. Nazi Germany had just invaded the socialist Soviet Union, and faced a long bitter battle there. Britain was on the ropes. France was conquered and partitioned. Japan was bogged down trying to hold large chunks of China—and facing a growing resistance headed by Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party. And there was an opening for the U.S. to weigh in and eventually take over much of the world.

And by 1941, the Japanese imperialists were starting to encroach on areas that the U.S. considered its vital interests—including threatening the key U.S. sources of rubber and tin in southeast Asia. On July 26, 1941, Japan began occupying the strategic rubber-growing area of southern Vietnam. The next day the U.S. froze all Japanese assets in the U.S. and forced Britain and Holland to follow suit.

The U.S. imposed embargoes of scrap iron and oil—key resources that Japan needed from overseas to maintain its industry and military. And it meant war was certain unless Japan capitulated to all U.S. demands to withdraw from the area. Howard Zinn writes in *A People's History of the United States*, "The records show that a White House conference two weeks before Pearl Harbor anticipated a war and discussed how it should be justified."

On November 25, 1941, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum demanding that they evacuate Indochina and China and recognize U.S. ally General Chiang Kai-shek as the only legitimate government in China. They knew the Japanese would not comply.

That evening Secretary of War Stimson recorded in his diary: "[The President] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday, for the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. This was a difficult proposition."

The next day, the army chief of staff, George C. Marshall, sent the following cable to the commanding general in Hawai'i: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the task assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

In other words, they were saying: *This is it! We are going to war against Japan. Make sure they strike the first blow so they can be branded as the aggressor. And, whatever you do, don't let the masses of people find out our plan!*

Meanwhile, the U.S. had broken the code for secret Japanese diplomatic transmissions in August of 1940. Every day, top U.S. officials read cables between Tokyo and its embassies. They knew on December 7 that an attack was coming, somewhere, though they didn't know where.

Japan's militarist government, facing war against a much bigger and economically stronger rival, decided to go for a decisive strike--hoping to put the U.S. on the defensive while Japan's military consolidated their gains in Asia. And one thing that can be said for watching the air raid in the movie *Pearl Harbor*, it does remind you of the usefulness of surprise when seeking to defeat an enemy like U.S. imperialism.

Still, overall, the U.S. ruling class saw the Japanese raid on Hawaii as an opportunity to enter the war, despite the fact that they suffered some initial losses (mainly in aging warships, and not in the aircraft carrier core of their fleet).

In his diary, Secretary Henry Stimson wrote: "When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.'

The ones really surprised when the attack finally came on December 7 were the masses of people in the U.S. As for the FDR government, the war they wanted and expected had come in a way that politically allowed them to mask their real motives and goals. A colonial war could be portrayed as a war of defense. A new stage of U.S. aggression could be portrayed as a war *against* aggression.

Bourgeois historians can and do argue over which act started the war, and which side hit first. But for class conscious proletarians and oppressed peoples, these controversies of who *provoked* the war are irrelevant next to the important fact about the basic *class nature* of this conflict: The war between Japan and the U.S. was an unjust imperialist war on *both sides*.

The U.S. war campaign that followed was waged in a notoriously genocidal and reactionary way. Japanese people were openly portrayed in the U.S.--and to the U.S. soldiers--as fanatical and vicious subhumans who deserved to be extinguished to the last person. The glorification of a U.S. revenge raid on Japan that happens in the movie *Pearl Harbor* is particularly disturbing since it completely ignores how such raids eventually built up to the 1945 firebombing of Tokyo and the criminal nuclear attack on the two civilian cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

General Curtis LeMay, commander of the Tokyo attack, later said: "I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately, we were on the winning side."

**Whose Interests?**

"*War is the continuation of politics by other means.*"

Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832
"A revolutionary class cannot but wish for the defeat of its government in a reactionary war, cannot fail to see that its military reverses facilitate its overthrow."

V.I. Lenin, *Socialism and War*, 1915

"If you were going to make a case about how much more terrible the fascist states were than the democracies, you’d make it better in Europe where there was more democracy than you would if you went in some of the colonial countries and started arguing about how great British imperialism was for India, for example, as compared with Japanese imperialism and its colonies."


World War 2 has often been portrayed as "the good war"--as the time when the U.S. was involved in some great anti-fascist crusade, where progressive people could fight for the red-white-and-blue and yet still (somehow) serve the interests of the people of the world.

This is a deeply mistaken view that badly damaged the class consciousness of a whole generation of communists and working people in the U.S. Its lingering influence supports deep illusions about the capitalist system and the nature of U.S. government and military today. The idea that there was some "good war" in the past, where U.S. imperialism played some "progressive anti-fascist role," is used by some as proof that it could happen once again--that the U.S. could become what it says it is, a defender of democracy and human rights in the world.

A world war is (obviously) a vast and complex event--where people of many countries and of opposing classes are drawn into conflict, fighting for their interests and for their vision of the future. There were revolutionary struggles taking place during that war, struggles that deserved support and great sacrifice from the masses of people. The Soviet Union fought one of history's most bitter wars against powerful forces of Nazi Germany, in defense of its then-socialist society. The people of many countries waged resistance during World War 2 against imperialism--including in China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Philippines. And these were national liberation struggles that, under the leadership of communists like Mao Tsetung, were part of the larger worldwide revolutionary struggle to overthrow imperialism.

But the war that the U.S. waged in the Pacific was of a fundamentally different kind: that war was an extension of imperialist politics and rivalry that had grown over decades. And the second world war arose, overall and fundamentally, from such inter-imperialist rivalry--waged throughout the world, including in Europe, North Africa, and in the Pacific Basin. The second world war reached its resolution in a new imperialist redivision of the world--despite the fact that revolutionary struggles played a much bigger role in this war than in World War 1.

In fact, it is possible to see, with hindsight, what the U.S. forces were fighting for by seeing what emerged from that new redivision.

As early as 1940, study groups set up by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations mapped out plans for a new global order they intended to create after a victory in the world war (which they had not even yet joined). The U.S. emerged out of World War 2 proclaiming "the American Century"--it established over 400 military bases around the world, and set about bullying everyone in sight. From its defeated Japanese rival, it took over half of Korea, occupied Japan itself, seized Okinawa, maneuvered unsuccessfully to dominate China, retook the Philippines and seized the many island chains of the Pacific. Not content with that, it also seized many areas previously dominated by its allies. In the post-war world, the U.S. emerged as the main oppressor in the former French colony in Indochina, with its hand deep in formerly Dutch Indonesia and formerly British Malaysia. Hundreds of millions of people got a new oppressor and were slated for a future of sweatshops, occupation, sex trade and financial domination. Meanwhile, some of the Pacific islands that the marines "liberated" became ground zero
As for the talk of "anti-fascist war"—the U.S. saw continuing use for fascist dictatorships after World War 2, and backed them all over the world—including Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in China (and then Taiwan), Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Diem and then Thieu in southern Vietnam, plus a string of torturers in southern Korea and elsewhere. U.S. generals went on to wage brutal counterrevolutionary wars against the people of Asia—General Douglas MacArthur tried to conquer the Korean peninsula for U.S. imperialism, and even dreamed of invading China to overthrow the victorious 1949 Maoist revolution. General Curtis LeMay went on to direct the U.S. bombing of Vietnam—where he coined the phrase "Bomb them back to the Stone Age."

Now, 60 years after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. cause in World War 2 is portrayed as noble—in books and film. Those who fought it are glorified as "the greatest generation."

Well, what is so "great" about killing to create a bigger U.S. empire? What is so noble about a naïve patriotism that made people think they were fighting "against fascism and aggression"—while they brought nuclear attack and new oppression to the people of Asia and the Pacific?

This war for the Pacific was an oppressors' war to expand and consolidate oppression. Their victories are not our victories. And their defeats and setbacks are something to welcome (then and now)—because they create openings both here and around the world for people to overthrow them and everything they stand for.

This article is posted in English and Spanish on Revolutionary Worker Online rwor.org
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DICK’S LETTER TO ADG 12-2-11, 221 words

Dear Editor:

In your newspaper November 22, Mr. Richard Dixon reminded us of the importance of Pearl Harbor. One of his claims deserves reconsideration: “Never in the history of military warfare had there been such an instance of unprovoked war upon a U.S. naval base.” I was nine years old when the attack on Pearl occurred, Dec. 7, 1941, and for most of my life I believed the attack was unprovoked. But in recent years, many historians have concluded that the attack on Pearl was the inevitable outcome of colonial competition over resources (oil, rubber) between the U.S. and European nations—Netherlands, France, England—and Japan, and the Dec. 7 bombing specifically motivated by the U.S. and allied embargo of Japan. The Japanese attack on the U.S. should have surprised nobody. The U.S. and other western nations were not going to share their empires with the Japanese without a fight. The Pacific was sometimes called “the American Lake,” and the Europeans depended upon the resources of their colonies. Likewise the Japanese were not going to abandon their urgent imperial expansion for resources. Their economic desperation, militarism, and underestimation of U.S. power and determination led them to attack. The imperial arrangement of nations at the time made the war almost inevitable. Read the book No Choice But War by Roland Worth, Jr. for a careful analysis of this history.
Response to Newsletter #3 from Prof. Sonny San Juan
8:07 PM to me

Thanks for this bonanza of articles. I will read all of them because I am participating in an international conference on "War Memories and Literature" in Taiwan next week. Indeed, our lifetime and that of our parents have been dominated by world wars and wars of all kinds--both total war and regional wars...

Cheers, Dick, and thanks for your thoughtfulness!
Sonny

http://philcsc.wordpress.com